J.S.Mills One Very Simple Principle: An Analysis

J.S. grinds One Very Simple Principle An AnalysisHow h acest is J.S. loiters one very open tenet?In and of itself, the principle is exactly when simple it takes bargonly a line to be introduced, and is easily lowstood. The furbish up end for which hu human beingkindkind are warranted, individually or collectively, in meddle some(prenominal) with the autonomy of consummation of any of their number, is self-protection ( lollygag,1869 pg 9). He goes on to excuse ex make a motionly what he means, but that single line encapsulates the principle itself, without requiring surplus clarification. Subsequent lines do non in any way conflict this put inment, they unless emphasise. The principle by itself being simple, however, does non mean that its implications and ramifications are so straightforward it may seem clear, but logical absurdities rotter be found can paternalistic interference be warrant when, for example, the subdivision of mankind has no knowledge of how d angerous his activities are? The unmixed example is that of the twain, which calculates to be intact, but give collapse if a man steps on it. A turn to and literal reading of Mills principle would forbid anyone from interfering when a man unknowingly took a step onto this bridge such an interpretation would not, however, be bazar either to Mill or to the unfortunately ill-informed member of community. The principle is thereof simple to demesne, but not so simple to chthonianstand. It has its subtleties, and must be considered, rather than straightforwardly accepted.Before continuing, it is important to note what it is Mill is kernel with the word freedom referring to it without an accepted definition would at top hat be confusing, and far worse could potentially tip to a highly direct understanding. Mills use of the word is value free. That is not to goern that he has no morals, just that when he writes, freedom is not judged. It consists merely of the ability to a ct following ones own desires. If one can follow these desires, one is free. If one cannot, he is not. There is no further free weighting given to whatever those bring throughs may be, whether they are purchase a newspaper or committing murder all that matters when it comes to freedom is whether or not a someone with the desire to carry out an body process is permitted to do so (Scanlan, 1958 pg 198).Mills writings were concerned with provide over the individual, but not merely with the legislative power of the state he was deeply concerned with the moral force that society was up to(p) of exercising over the individual. It was not merely the capacity of an over strong government or monarch about which he wrote. The capacity for the totalism of the majority over the individual also concerned him deeply. For this reason it is by chance surprising that he installed caveats immediately after his principle a mans own good was a valid reason for remonstrating with him, or reas oning, or persuading, or entreating (Mill pg 9). This level of input that Mill considered acceptable under such circumstances perhaps goes a long way towards mitigating the lose of any driven interference that he was willing to accept in his eyes, a sufficiently great force of remonstration represented an almost compulsive effect due to societal forces, against which he frequently railed. Even though his principle would ban any existent compulsion, consideration of Mills normal arguing position reveals that he was prepared to permit events in the interests of protective paternalism which he typically considered to be undue influence over others. The interplay between state, society and the individual is a leitmotif of Mills writings, and merely because the theory he states forbids the state from carrying out an act does not mean that he does not feel it should be permitted indeed, in this scenario when not only does he not forbid societal interaction, but positively encourages i ntervention of a kind suggests that he was willing to allow society to attempt to morally force people down a track which was less rail atful to the individual concerned. The principle itself remains simple, but the mount in which it is framed is significantly more complex.Joel Feinberg concludes that the state has a indemnify to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct only when it is substantially non voluntary or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not. (quoted in Arneson, 1980 pg 470). In the example of the bridge referenced earlier, an ill informed member of the earthly concern stepping on a bridge which would collapse under their weight could not be said to be play acting voluntarily the state would be well within its rights in such a scenario under Mills logic to station a guard patrolling the area, to restrain in and tackle such ill-informed people, stopping them from involuntarily taking the inglorious step. If, however, th ey are running towards the bridge and shouting about how they know it will kill them, his logic would forbid the guard from taking any direct action. Whatever we feel about this compulsion to allow people to harm themselves if they so choose, it is a basic tenet of liberalism, that people know what the best for themselves is, and that interfering in their desire to pursue their own good in their own way is intrinsically wrong.This can, however, be harder to test than it would originally appear what if the soulfulness is, for example, mentally ill? Indeed, if a person wishes to take an act which can obviously further their good but contains in it some storey of harm, or pain, we can easily understand both why a person, or state, would want to interfere and why they should be prevented from doing so. in so far if a person states that they wish to follow a course of action that will bring them no obvious benefit, and yet will distinctly generate a great deal of harm, at what point should the state step in to take action? Is a mental opinion to determine their sanity unjust interference? After all, if a person is mentally unstable, surely they cannot truly be said to be acting of their own free will. Informed consent means more than merely knowing what the risks are, it means understanding what the consequences mean.Furthermore, Mills principle divides matters crucially into two areas the personal and the public. Even if all the questions relating to the private are answered satisfactorily, the questions relating to public actions are somewhat greater when a man acts, it will typically affect others, however mildly. If the impact of these effects is to infringe upon the rights or rapture of others, past the state and the people are justified, under Mills logic, in interfering with their actions. So what about the guard on the bridge compelled to allow the suicidal to continue running, and then forced to witness their deaths? Could it be said that in order to prevent this mental anguish, the runner should be prevented from acting? Mill gives great consideration to various potential actions posterior in On Liberty, showing how his simple principle can be interpreted and used. The guard can of course turn away, and in Mills time such considerations would not endure been given more than thought, so long before modern estimations about mental health. It is a question that would have been interesting to see Mills actual argument, but we must make do with merely applying his principle in order to find his likely answer ourselves. It is unconvincing he would have wishes it to have an impact on the consideration of the action after all, if it did then any serious act could be prevented only when by placing psyche there who would be injured by watching it. It is highly unlikely he would have even momentarily entertained this massive crushing of individual intimacy. There is not necessarily any deficiency to over-think Mills principl e by inventing wild circumstances and asking whether or not his decisions would still apply.Mills one very simple principle is, at the point of statement, very simple indeed the only circumstances in which mankind may interfere in the liberty of another is in the interest of protecting harm to others. no.action may be taken solely due to the apparent interests of the person whose liberty would be interfered with. This ban on paternalism assumes a high degree of freedom and responsibility, and more than that, in order to be applied simply it seems to assume a very high degree of knowledge, and to discount the surmise of mental illness at least that which cannot easily be tested. Feinberg attempts to count on for this with his assertion that actions may be interfered with when a person is not acting voluntarily, or when it is not clear that they are acting voluntarily, and this is an appealing idea when the hypothetical person is heading for the equally hypothetical damaged bridge , trouble to as original whether or not they know that stepping on it will lead to death cannot be rectified after the fact. Interfering in their liberty whilst those checks are made may be odious, but it is merely temporary, and need not be seen as an infringement of Mills principle. Overall, the principle itself is indeed very simple it is merely application in certain fringe circumstances which has any need to become anything to the contrary.References behind Stuart Mill, On Liberty 4th Ed. Longman, Roberts Green, London, 1869Richard J. Arneson, Mill versus Paternalism, in Ethics, Vol. 90, no(prenominal) 4. (Jul., 1980), pp. 470-489.James Bogen Daniel M. FarrelL, immunity and Happiness in Mills Defence of Liberty in The philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28, zero(prenominal) 113. (Oct., 1978), pp. 325-338.Clark W. Bouton, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and History in The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Sep., 1965), pp. 569-578.D. G. Brown, Mill on Liberty and ethical mo tive in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 2. (Apr., 1972), pp. 133-158.Robert W. Hoag, Happiness and Freedom Recent subject on John Stuart Mill in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2. (Spring, 1986), pp. 188-199.David Lyons, Human Rights and the General Welfare in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Winter, 1977), pp. 113-129.James P. Scanlan, J. S. Mill and the Definition of Freedom in Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 3. (Apr., 1958), pp. 194-206.J. Salwyn Schapiro, John Stuart Mill, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in England in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 4, No. 2. (Apr., 1943), pp. 127-160.C. L. Ten, Mill and Liberty in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Jan. Mar., 1969), pp. 47-68.